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ARGUMENTS
CBM and State Farm received a Brief from WCF. No other briefs from
Antonio or the Commission were filed with this court or received by CBM and
State Farm. As a result, CBM/State Farm's arguments here are in reply to the
Brieffiledby WCF.
The Issues and Arguments
As an initial observation, WCF appears to lump all of CBM/State Farm's
arguments under the issue of "substantial evidence."

This clearly does not

represent a fair reading of the issues and arguments presented by CBM and State
Farm in their Brief of the Appellants. As a result, CBM and State Farm ask the
court to also consider their issues and arguments which extend beyond "substantial
evidence" and to note that WCF failed to address these other issues and arguments
in their Brief.
The Medical Evidence Cited by WCF
In its Brief on page 3, WCF concedes that the ALJ's findings in her Interim
Order did not inform the Panel that Antonio was free of left knee pain leading up
to the February 12, 2009 accident (on February 11, 2009 or February 12, 2009).
As noted by WCF, the ALJ was "silent" about Antonio's left knee condition during
this period of time. In an attempt to fill the void left by this silence, WCF places
much stock in Dr. Goucher's medical note dated March 4, 2009 that indicated the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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left knee injection he provided on February 9, 2009 "worked for about a week."
R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 58. WCF argues that
this medical evidence (which was cited three times in the medical records) could
not have confused the Panel because "about a week" could have been interpreted to
mean only the 3 days following Dr. Goucher's injection leading up to the February
12, 2009 accident. Aside from the unreasonableness of this assertion, the Panel
was clearly left to determine the period of time during which the injection was
effective in relationship to the February 12, 2009 accident because the ALJ did not
provide this information to them. Based on Dr. Goucher's comments, the Panel
may have been led to believe that the February 12, 2009 accident resulted in a
minimal increase in pain. Indeed, the Panel described "some increased left knee
pain" following Antonio's February 12, 2009 accident and noted that the February
12,2009 incident was "minor" with some "increased pain for perhaps 15 minutes."
R., pages 125-126. This hardly demonstrates a keen understanding of Antonio's
testimony during which he stated in no uncertain terms that his left knee pain
escalated from zero to "7 or 8" at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident.
Conspicuously absent from WCF's argument, Dr. Goucher also indicated on
March 4, 2009 that Antonio "was feeling really good but then slowly started to get
bad over the last couple of weeks." R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits,
Exhibit 6, page 58. [emphasis supplied] This would have placed the initial
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deterioration of Antonio's left knee pain after the February 12, 2009 accident
(around February 18,2009) thereby minimizing the effect of the February 12, 2009
accident on Antonio's left knee pain. Again, this comment by Dr. Goucher only
serves to obfuscate the profound impact of the February 12, 2009 accident despite
the absolute numbing effect of the February 9,2009 injection, and does not support
WCF's argument that when Dr. Goucher said "about a week," the Panel was
provided an adequate description of Antonio's left knee pain levels from the
February 9, 2009 injection to the time of the February 12, 2009 accident.

Dr.

Goucher's ultimate conclusions about whether a new injury occurred on February
12, 2009 (ambiguous as they are, but upon which WCF also affords great weight)
were certainly not based on Antonio's clear, unrefuted testimony at hearing, and
therefore, provided no real insight to the Panel about the effect of the February 9,
2009 injection and intense left knee pain caused by the February 12, 2009 accident
despite the total numbing effect of the injection.
The only other medical evidence cited by WCF in support of the Panel's
conclusions is Dr. Marble's opinion. However, Dr. Marble did not make note in
his report of the effect of the injection leading up to the February 12, 2009 accident
and the significant increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident.
Instead, Dr. Marble incorrectly observed that Antonio "had remained symptomatic
with a marginal outcome following his knee surgery" and simply felt "a twinge of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pain in his left knee" at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident. R., page 186,
Joint Medical Record Exhibits, pages 72 and 75. Again, this information, which
was markedly inconsistent with Antonio's sworn testimony, failed to inform the
Panel about what really happened with Antonio's left knee pain leading up to and
at the time of the February 12,2009 accident.
As a further example of WCF's struggle to minimize the ALJ's failure to
provide the Panel complete information about the February 12, 2009 accident,
WCF twice noted in its Brief (on pages 2 and 6) that Antonio's left knee pain
returned to its "baseline" after the February 12, 2009 accident. WCF defined
"baseline" as Antonio's "pre-injection status." This editorial remark appears
nowhere in the medical records and illustrates the intrinsic problem with the ALJ's
refusal to include in her findings to the Panel a clear understanding that Antonio's
"baseline" pain prior to the February 12, 2009 accident was zero. Notably, Dr.
Marble in his report simply referred to a return to "preinjury status" following the
February 12, 2009 accident and made no observation that Antonio's pain before
the February 12, 2009 accident was zero. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record
Exhibits, page 75. When the Panel noted a return to "baseline" in their report, they
were referring to "continued and increasing pain interfering with work and
(Antonio's) quality of life" leading up to the February 12, 2009 accident. R., page
127.

As demonstrated by the uncontroverted testimony at hearing, Antonio's
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baseline pain leading up to the February 12, 2009 accident was zero, and he never
returned to a zero pain level after the February 12, 2009 accident.

This is

information which is enormously significant considering Dr. Goucher's prediction
of a period of no left knee pain after the February 9, 2009 injection for a period of
at least two weeks (as stated by Antonio in his testimony). Given that the February
12, 2009 accident interrupted this period of pain relief and because Antonio's left
knee pain never returned to zero after the February 12, 2009 accident, the
significant effect of this accident was improperly minimized by WCF, the ALJ,
and the Board. If the ALJ had provided to the Panel in her findings a complete
description of Antonio's left knee pain leading up to and at the time of the
February 12,2009 accident, the Panel's concept of "baseline" prior to the February
12, 2009 accident may have been appreciably different.

Because of the ALJ's

failure to include Antonio's unrefuted testimony, the Panel never had an
opportunity to evaluate it in arriving at their conclusions.
The Board's Rationale
As noted by WCF, the Board summarily concluded that "temporary pain
relief due to the injection is not dispositive of a separate injury." R., page 183. On
its face, this statement ignores the pronounced increase in left knee pain at the time
of the February 12, 2009 accident despite this "temporary pain relief." Further, the
Board provided no medical evidence or legal support to explain how it could arrive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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at such a specific conclusion. The Panel certainly did not provide this opinion
because it was not fairly apprised of the effect of the February 9, 2009 injection
and the significant increase in Antonio's left knee pain when the February 12,2009
accident occurred. Mostly, the Board's presumptive statement defines the essence
of CBM/State Farm's arguments because such a statement flies in the face of the
Commission's requirement to fairly and accurately adjudicate the claim based on
findings which are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah App. 1991).

By

simply relying on the Panel's ultimate conclusion that Antonio did not suffer a new
injury on February 12, 2009, the Board committed the same error as the ALJ by
predicating its order on a medical opinion founded on an incomplete assessment of
unrefuted facts and thenfillingin the blanks with unsupported assumptions.
The Effect of the ALJ's Findings on Medical Causation
The ALJ's failure (as admitted by WCF) to provide the Panel with Antonio's
unrebutted testimony that his left knee pain shot from zero up to 7-8 at the time of
his February 12, 2009 accident was a significant omission which left the Panel to
develop the evidence without the benefit of Antonio's own words at hearing.
Because of this omission, the Panel's medical opinion concerning medical
causation was distorted by the ALJ's inaccurate description of Antonio's left knee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

pain in the days leading up to and at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident.
WCF's attempt to support the Panel's conclusions with inaccurate and incomplete
medical evidence does not change the importance of the ALJ's (and the Board's)
omission.
Medical causation is an integral component in determining the
compensability of the February 12, 2009 accident. Allen v. Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Considering that the ALJ based her final order largely
on the Panel's report concerning medical causation (and that the Board
subsequently supported this order), the ALJ's decision to leave out in her findings
to the Panel key, unrebutted hearing testimony provided by Antonio under oath in
spite of CBM/State Farm's objections cannot be excused, and constituted a failure
by the ALJ to serve as fact-finder to the Panel, an abuse of the ALJ's discretion,
and an abrogation of CBM/State Farm's due process rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for all the reasons included in the Brief of the
Appellants, CBM and State Farm request that the portion of the Order on Motion
for Review and Order of Remand of the Board dated May 31,2011 which affirmed
the ALJ's award of medical benefits against CBM and State Farm be reversed, that
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be
set aside (concerning the ALJ's award of medical benefits and interest against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
7 contain errors.

CBM and State Farm), that CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel
Report dated December 10, 2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM
and State Farm to pay for Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed,
that a hearing be ordered to clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10,
2010, and/or that further evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for
consideration and clarification.
Respectfully submitted this '&~~ day of February, 2012.
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH & STERN, LLC

B,S>SC—«
Jeff Francis, (#11370)
743 Horizon Court, Suite 103
Grand Junction, CO 81506
Telephone: 970.263.0500
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants
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Westlaw.
Page 1
821 P.2d 1
(Citeas:821P.2dl)

Court of Appeals of Utah,
Roberta N. ADAMS, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, and Unicorp, Respondents.
No.900597-CA.
Nov. 5,1991.
Workers' compensation claimant sought judicial review of decision of Industrial Commission
denying her benefits as result of her alleged repetitive motion syndrome. The Court of Appeals, Bench
, P.J., held that Industrial Commission did not sufficiently indicate factual basis for its decision merely
by summarizing contradictory evidence presented,
without in any way indicating which evidence it
found to be more credible, and stating in conclusory
terms that preponderance of medical evidence established that claimant's symptoms were not work
related
Vacated and remanded.
WestHeadnotes

required no deference to Commission. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-16(4).
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A ©=*
486
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
!5Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 0 ^ 4 8 8
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak488 k. Conclusions. Most Cited Cases
Administrative agency must make findings of
fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate review.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
13] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € ^ >
486

{1] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1939.1
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.1 k. In General; Questions of Law or Fact. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 413kl939)
Question of whether Industrial Commission's
findings were sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review was legal determination that

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15A1V(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative agency's failure to disclose specific subsidiary finding may or may not be fatal to
agency's decision, where agency's findings reveal
steps taken by agency in reaching its decision.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
14] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A € = >
484.1

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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821 P.2d 1
(Citeas:821P.2dl)
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak484.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 15Ak484)
Administrative finding may be implied if it is
clear from record on review that finding was actually made as part of administrative tribunal's decision; however, reviewing court may not simply
assume that any undisclosed finding was in fact
made. U.C.A. 1953,63-46b-16(4).
[5] Administrative Law and Procedure ISA G^>
750
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak750 k. Burden of Showing Error.
Most Cited Cases
Party wishing to defend administrative
agency's decision must cany burden of showing
that any undisclosed findings were actually made.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1741
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl741 k. Recital of Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
Industrial Commission did not satisfy its obligation to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact
to permit meaningful appellate review, where Commission merely set forth competing diagnoses
without in any way indicating which diagnoses it
found to be more credible and stated in conclusoiy

terms that preponderance of medical evidence did
not establish that claimant's symptoms were causally connected to job. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[7] Administrative Law and Procedure ISA 0=>
486
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative bodies may not rely upon findings that contain only ultimate conclusions.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[8] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €>=>
486
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15 Ak484 Findings
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited
Cases
Mere summary of contradictory evidence
presented at administrative hearing does not constitute "findings of fact" sufficient to permit judicial
review; administrative agency must indicate what it
determines in fact occurred, and not merely what
die contradictory evidence indicates might have occurred. U.CA.1953, 63-46b-16(4).
[9] Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1939.5
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XV1(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 3
821 P.2d 1
(Citeas:821P.2dl)
413kl939.5 k. Conflicting Evidence. Most Cited Cases
It is responsibility of administrative law judge
in workers' compensation proceeding to resolve
fectual conflicts. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[10] Workers1 Compensation 413 €=>1740
413 Workers* Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XV1(P) Hearing or Trial
413XV1(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl740 k. Opinion or Reasons.
Most Cited Cases
Workers' Compensation 413 €^>1744
413 Workers1 Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVl(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413W737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413H744 k. Ultimate or Evidentiary Facts. Most Cited Cases
To address errors claimed by workers' compensation claimant in decision of Industrial Commission, Court of Appeals had to have findings that
indicated respectively the issues decided, the legal
interpretations and applications made, and the subsidiary factual findings in support of Industrial
Commission's decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[11] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1738
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency

413kl738 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
To satisfy its statutory obligation to make findings of fact sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review, Industrial Commission, at
minimum, had to identify medical condition from
which claimant was suffering, and to give some explanation, factual or legal, as to how claimant failed
to prove causation. U.CA.1953,63-46b-16(4).
112] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1366
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XV1(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof
413XVI(L)2 Particular Matters
413kl356 Injuries or Death for Which
Compensation May Be Had
413kl366 k. Aggravation or Acceleration of Previously Impaired Condition. Most
Cited Cases
Workers' compensation claimant with preexisting medical condition must prove both legal and
medical causation.
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 0=^1738
413 Workers1 Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial
413XVI(P)6 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Board, Commission, or Court
413kl737 Form, Contents, and Sufficiency
413kl738 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Court of Appeals is unable to assume feat any
given finding was in fact made by Industrial Commission, where multiple conflicting versions of
facts create matrix of possible factual findings.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[14] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€^816

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Woiics.
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821 P.2d 1
(Cite as: 821 P.2d 1)
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15 AV(F) Determination
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Setting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited
Cases
Administrative agency's failure to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact to permit meaningful appellate review does not necessarily require
vacation of order complained of, if agency's error
has not substantially prejudiced petitioner.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[15] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
C^>749
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15 AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak749 k. Presumptions. Most Cited
Cases
When considering error that is strictly of administrative agency's own making, such as failing
to make adequate findings, any doubt about whether petitioner was prejudiced is resolved in petitioner's favor. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[16] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€^784.1
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(E) Particular Questions, Review of
15Ak784 Fact Questions
15Ak784.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 15 Ak784)
There is substantial prejudice inherent in
agency's failure to make adequate factual findings,
when evidence is not clear and uncontroverted.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[17] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

€==>485
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak484 Findings
15Ak485 k. Necessity and Purpose.
Most Cited Cases
Complete, accurate, and consistent findings of
fact are essential to proper determination by administrative agency. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[18] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
€=^485
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15A1V Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15 Ak484 Findings
15Ak485 k. Necessity and Purpose.
Most Cited Cases
Factual findings are integral part of logical process that administrative tribunal must go through in
reaching a decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[19] Workers1 Compensation 413 € ^ 1 9 3 9 . 2
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact,
Findings, and Verdict
413kl939 Review of Decision of Department, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrator
413kl939.2 k. Review of Fact
Questions in General. Most Cited Cases
Any doubt as to whether: workers' compensation claimant was prejudiced by Industrial Commission's failure to make adequate factual findings supporting its denial of benefits would be resolved in
claimant's favor in case in which evidence was not
clear and uncontroverted. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16
(4).
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821 P.2d 1
(Cite as: 821
120] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

by its new findings and conclusions of law.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).

15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(F) Determination
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Setting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited
Cases
As general rule, appropriate relief for agency's
feilure to make adequate findings is to vacate order
complained of and to order agency to make more
adequate findings in support of, and more fully articulate reasons for, die determination which it
made. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l6(4).

*3 Linda M. Barclay (argued), Howard, Lewis &
Petersen, Provo, for petitioner.

[21] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1935
413 Workers' Compensation
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)12 Scope and Extent of Re
view in General
413kl935 k. Presumptions and Burden
of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases
Absent adequate findings, there is no presumption that Industrial Commission's decision denying
workers' compensation benefits was correct.
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4).
[22] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1951
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposi
tion of Proceeding
413kl951 k. Further Proceedings Before Board, Commission, or Trial Court Most Cited
Cases
Upon vacation of Industrial Commission's order denying workers1 compensation benefits, based
on Commission's failure to make adequate findings
in support of its decision, Commission was free to
deny benefits or grant benefits as might be dictated

Richard Sumsion (argued), Salt lake City, for
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
Benjamin J. Simms, Salt Lake City, for Industrial
Com'nofUtah.
Before BENCH, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and
ORME,JJ.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Roberta Adams seeks review of the
Industrial Commission's decision to deny her benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-2-1 to -65 (1988). We
vacate the Commission's order.
FACTS
Adams worked as a telemarketer for Unicorp.
Her duties consisted primarily of dialing telephone
numbers and talking on the telephone while sitting
at a desk. She was not equipped with a headset or
any type of automatic dialing equipment She was
required to dial manually and hold the receiver to
her ear and mouth. After working at Unicorp for
approximately one year, Adams left Unicorp to
seek medical attention for debilitating pain she
claimed had developed gradually as a result of her
employment. In general, Adams now claims that
the repetitive motion of calling on a manual phone
and holding the phone to her mouth and ear caused
her neck pain, neck stiflhess, muscle spasm, pain in
her right arm and shoulder, a "pins and needles"
sensation and numbness in her right shoulder and
arm, and fatigue.
When Adams informed her supervisor of her
pain, he referred her to his chiropractor, Dr. Robert
Pope, for treatment. Dr. Pope examined her and
diagnosed her as having "cervico-brachial syn-
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drome, carpal tunnel syndrome, myofascitis, and
brachial neuralgia." Adams's condition was subsequently described by Dr. Pope as "repetitive motion syndrome." Dr. Pope also indicated that he believed there was a very high probability that
Adams's condition resulted from her job duties.
Adams then began to see another chiropractor,
Dr. Arnold Otterson, whose office was closer to her
home. Dr. Otterson diagnosed Adams as having
acute traumatic cervico-brachial syndrome with associated brachial neuralgia. Dr. Otterson likewise
described Adams's condition as repetitive motion
syndrome. He treated.her for several months and
her condition improved. Dr. Otterson indicated to
the Industrial Commission that in his professional
opinion, Adams's "condition was directly related to
her employment due to repetitive use of the phone."
Adams was next seen and evaluated by Dr.
Richard Jackson, an orthopedic surgeon. His evaluation indicated that Adams was suffering from a degenerative C5-6 disc. Inasmuch as Dr. Jackson did
not deal with head and neck problems, he referred
Adams to Dr. Joseph R. Watkins, a neurologist Dr.
Watkins diagnosed Adams as having "work related
cervical strain with some head discomfort and right
shoulder discomfort" and "stress syndrome with
multiple other symptoms, essentially resolved with
resolution of work."
The Workers' Compensation Fund (the Fund)
required Adams to undergo an independent medical
evaluation by Dr. Edward Spencer. Dr. Spencer observed from the medical records that Adams had
spondylosis of the C4-5 and C5-6 disc with narrowing at the C5-6 level. He also observed a narrowed
L4-5 and L5-S1 disc with osteophyte formation
from L5 at the L5-S1 level. Dr. Spencer diagnosed
Adams as having probable "conversion disorder,"
"chronic cervical and lumbar disc disease," " chondromalacia of the patello-femoral joint," and "
obesity and poor conditioning." He further found
that her major problem was psychological and did
not require any additional medical or surgical treatment for her condition.

The Fund then required Adams to be examined
by Dr. Leonard W. Jarcho, the *4 former head of
the Neurology Department at the University of
Utah. Dr. Jarcho concluded that Adams did not
have any neurological problem that he could identify. He also indicated that he believed that the minimal orthopedic problem was not connected to
Adams's complaints or her prior employment. Dr.
Jarcho described Adams's reactions, activities and
movements during the examination as "strange,"
and concluded that Adams was in need of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment
As directed by the Fund, Adams was then examined by Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist,
who was assisted by Dr. Leslie M. Cooper, a clinical psychologist. Dr. McCann concluded that Adams
suffered from a personality disorder and did not
have any physical impairment or other problems associated with her employment, but that her complaints were motivated by a desire to obtain compensation.
A hearing was then held where the foregoing
conflicting diagnoses were presented to an administrative law judge (A.L.J.). The A.L.J. denied benefits. Adams appealed the A U . ' s decision to the
Commission, which affirmed the decision and adopted the findings and conclusions of the A.L J . as
its own. Adams now seeks review of the Commission's decision.
Adams presents three claims for our determination: (1) the Commission's findings and conclusions
should be reversed because they are insufficient as
a matter of law, (2) the Commission's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and
(3) her condition constitutes a compensable condition under Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800
P.2d 330 (Utah App.1990) (interpreting Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). Inasmuch as we find that the Commission's findings are
insufficient and order additional findings, we do not
address points (2) and (3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Our review of the Commission's denial of benefits is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant
part:
TLw appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:

(h) the agency action is
rary or capricious,
Utah Code A i

(iv) otherwise arbit-

16b 16(4) (1990).

[1] Adams claims that she is entitled to relief
under subsection (h). FNl The question of whether
the Commission's action constitutes arbitrary action
for want of adequate findings is governed by our
determination of whether this court is able to conduct a meaningful review. Whether the findings are
adequate is therefore a legal determination that requires no deference to the Commission.
FN I. Adams also claims the following sub
sections of section 63-46b-16(4) constitute
grounds for relief:
(c) the agency has not decided all of the
issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied die law;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court
Inasmuch as we reverse the Commission's order because its failure to make
adequate findings constituted arbitrary
action warranting relief under subsection

(h), we need not address the standards of
review for subsections (c), (d), and (g).
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS
[2] An administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate review.
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the findings must be
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P 2 d 996, 999
(Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979)).... *5 [T]he failure of an
agency to make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its findings " arbitrary and
capricious " unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion."
Id. (quoting Kinhella v. Bough, 660 P.2d 233, 236
(Utah 1983)).
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm\ 800 P 2 d 330,
335 (Utah App.1990), cert denied, 815 P 2d 241
(Utah 1991) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described
the detail required in administrative findings in order for findings to be deemed adequate.
[An administrative agency] cannot discharge its
statutory responsibilities without making findings
of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the
governing statutory standards. It is also essential
that [an administrative agency] make subsidiary
findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved
in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The importance of complete, accurate, and
consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper
determination by an administrative agency. To
that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual
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conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and
law, are reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton,
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such
findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing [an administrative agency's] order in accordance with established legal principles and of
protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious administrative action.
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986)
(emphasis added).
[3][4][5] If agency findings reveal the steps
taken by the agency in reaching its decision, the
failure to disclose a specific subsidiary finding may
or may not be fatal to the agency's decision. A finding may be implied if it is clear from the record,
and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding
was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision.
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-788, (Utah
1991) FN2 ^re m a y n o t m e r e iy assume, however,
that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. The
party wishing to defend an agency decision must
cany its burden of showing that the undisclosed
finding was actually made.
FN2. In so stating, we acknowledge that
our ruling in Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335, a
pre~UAPA case, that material subsidiary
findings may not be implied is limited under UAPA and the supreme court's language in Ramirez, UAPA recognizes the
possibility of implied factual findings. See
section 63-46b-16(4)(g). An agency decision may therefore be upheld under
UAPA despite the absence of express written findings regarding a material fact if the
reviewing court can determine that the material finding was in fact made, although
not expressly written.
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings
must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that
the Commission has properly arrived at the ultimate factual findings and has properly applied

the governing rules of law to those findings.... It
is not the prerogative of this Court to search the
record to determine whether findings could have
been made by the Commission to support its order, for to do so would be to usurp the function
with which the Commission is charged.
Mountain States Legal Found v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047,1052 (Utah 1981).
[6] The findings made by the A.LJ. and adopted by the Commission in the present case are inadequate in that they do not disclose the steps taken
by the Commission in reaching its decision to deny
Adams benefits. The Commission's "findings"
amount to the following single conclusory statement as to causation: "The preponderance of medical evidence in this case establishes that the applicant's various listed symptoms are not related to her
work as a telemarketer at Unicorp."
[7] Because the Commission concluded that
Adams failed to prove causation, the Commission
denied her benefits. The Commission correctly indicated in its adopted conclusions of law that causation is one of the ultimate factual conclusions that
must *6 be proven by a claimant See, e.g., Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
However, the Commission's conclusion that Adams
failed to prove causation, without supporting findings, is arbitrary. "Administrative bodies may not
rely upon findings that contain only ultimate conclusions." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App.1991). See also Vali
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health
Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah
App.I990) (statement of ultimate facts alone was
essentially pro forma). Cf Mountain States Legal
Found, 636 P.2d at 1052 ("Ultimate findings ...
must be sustained if there are adequate subordinate
findings to support them"). Given the numerous
legal and factual questions regarding causation in
this case,FhD the Commission's solitary finding
that Adams failed to prove causation does not give
the parties any real indication as to the bases for its
decision and the steps taken to reach it, nor does it
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give a reviewing court anything to review.
FN3. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §
35-2-27(28) (1988); Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P 2d 15 (Utah 1986).
[8][9] While the puiported "Findings of Fact"
written by the A.L.J. contain an informative summary of the evidence presented, such a rehearsal of
contradictory evidence does not constitute findings
of fact In order for a finding to truly constitute a
"finding of fact," it must indicate what the A.LJ.
determines in fact occurred, not merely what the
contradictory evidence indicates might have occurred. "[I]t is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to resolve factual conflicts." Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P2d 237, 241 (Utah
1987).
As is apparent in the recitation of the various
diagnoses presented to the A.L J., the doctors each
had differing explanations for Adams's medical
condition and whether it was caused by her employment The evidence did not merely indicate two
possible versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the Commission accepted one version over
another. The evidence shows several possible con
figurations and degrees of injury and/or disease, if
any, and the causes, if any, thereby creating a mat
rix of possible factual findings. A mere summary of
the conflicting evidence in this case therefore does
not give a clear indication of the A.L.J/s or the
Commission's view as to what in fact occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the Commission found there was no causation shown, we
clearly cannot assume that the Commission actually
made any of the possible subsidiary findings. The
findings are therefore inadequate.
[10] In order for this court to address the errors
claimed by Adams, we must have findings that indicate respectively (1) the issues decided, see section 63-46b-16(4Xc); (2) the legal interpretations
and applications made, see section 63-46b-16(4Xd);
and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in support of

the decision, see section 63-46b-16(4)(g). A simple
conclusion that Adams failed to prove medical
causation does not contain any of the foregoing information.
[II] At a minimum, there should have been a
finding in the present case identifying the occupational disease or injury, if any, suffered by Adams.
The Commission could not logically conclude that
Adams's medical condition, if any, was not caused
by her employment without first establishing what
her medical condition was.1*14 This it failed to do.
The Commission's findings of fact simply do not
"resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered
thereon." Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank 673 V2d
590,601 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted).
FN4. See, e,g„ Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335
(error for A.LJ. to apply higher standard
required of applicants with pre-existing
conditions that contributed to the injury
without first finding that the applicant had
a pre-existing condition which contributed
to the injury).
[12] The Commission should have also given
some explanation, factual or legal, as to how
Adams failed to prove causation. *7 An applicant
widi a pre-existing condition must prove both legal
and medical causation. See Allen, 729 P.2d at
25-27. The Commission relied upon Allen, but its
findings do not make it clear whether it believed
that Adams failed to prove medical or legal causation. Both issues were apparently involved in this
matter. Inasmuch as our standard of review varies
depending upon whether Adams failed to prove legal or medical causation, the Commission's failure to
identify whether Adams failed to prove legal or
medical causation prevents us from reviewing that
conclusion.
[13] When multiple conflicting versions of the
facts create a matrix of possible factual findings,
we are unable on appeal to assume that any given
finding was in fact made. See, e.g., Carton v.
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Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App.1988) (finding
giving only a lump sum total valuation of all marital property was inadequate to permit review of disputed valuations of individual marital assets). Because of the matrix of factual possibilities in the
present case, we are unable to conduct a meaningful
review. We therefore hold that the Commission's
denial of benefits based upon a solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of causation fails "to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
reached," id, and therefore renders the action arbitrary.
PREJUDICE
[14][15] Our conclusion that the Commission
acted arbitrarily by failing to enter adequate findings and legal conclusions does not end our inquiry,
however. As required by section 63-46b-16(4), the
agenc/s error must "substantially prejudice" the
petitioner before we may grant relief. The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated in Morton International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d
581, 584-585 (Utah 1991), that the substantial prejudice language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an
appellate court from granting relief if an agency error is harmless. The supreme court defined harmless error as being an error "sufficiently inconsequential that ... there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id We also note that when considering an error that is strictly of the agency's own making, such
as failing to make adequate findings, any doubt
about whether a petitioner was prejudiced is resolved in the petitioner's favor. Angell v. Board of
Review of Indus. Comm'n, 750 P.2d 611, 613 (Utah
App.1988).
[16][17][18] We recognize as a matter of law
the substantial prejudice inherent in the failure to
make adequate findings when the evidence is not
clear and uncontroverted. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335.
"The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper determination by an administrative agency." Milne

Truck Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. The findings are an
integral part of the logical process a tribunal must
go through in reaching a decision. See, e*g, Allred
v. Allred, 797 ?2d 1108, 1114 (Utah App.1990)
(final determination to be supported by adequate
findings "made in the course of employing" the
analytical approach established by the court on appeal). Cf Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372
(Utah 1988) ("trial court must make adequate findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has considered [relevant] factors" (emphasis added)). Once
an administrative agency attempts to state its findings, identify the applicable law, and articulate its
logic, it may discover that critical facts are not
properly before it,™5 that the law is other *8 than
anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In
such situations, a result contrary to the initial conclusions of the body may be dictated. The process
of articulation clearly enhances agency selfdiscipline and protects against arbitrary and capricious decisions. Without the safeguard of adequate
findings, there is no guarantee that the agency followed a logical process in reaching its decision. If,
on the other hand, the agency identifies the facts,
law, and reasoning supporting its decision, it reveals its logical process and the parties can be assured that a logical process occured, even if it is in
some manner flawed.
FN5. We recognize that an administrative
agency may hear evidence that is legally
inadmissible under the technical rules of
evidence; under the "residuum rule,"
however, its findings of fact cannot be
based exclusively on such inadmissible
evidence. "They must be supported by a
residuum of legal evidence competent in a
court of law." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984)
. See also Mayes v. Department of Employment Sea, 754 P.2d 989, 992 n. I (Utah
App.1988) (explaining inconsistent standards for admitting evidence and relying
upon evidence admitted). The process of
articulating the critical facts gives an ad-
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ministrative agency pause to ascertain
what evidence it may properly rely upon to
make such findings in light of the residuum mle. See, e.g., Tolman, at 31-32 (at a
minimum, issues regarding admissibility of
evidence should have been addressed in
the findings).
If an agency's logical process is flawed, its
shortcomings can be corrected on review, but only
if the agency creates findings revealing the evidence upon which it relies, the law upon which it relies, and its interpretation of the law. Absent adequate findings, a petitioner wishing to challenge
an agency's factual findings will not be able to marshal the evidence in support of the findings. See
generally Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of
the Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah
App.1989) (party challenging factual findings of
agency must marshal evidence in support of such
finding and show that it is not substantial). Nor will
a petitioner be able to challenge the agency's undeclared interpretation of the law or its undisclosed
logic. See, eg., State v. Lovegren, 798 P2d 767,
771 n. 11 (Utah App.1990) (trial court's failure to
make adequate findings "placed appellate counsel
at a disadvantage in framing and developing their
arguments on appear).
[19] If findings are inadequate, this court will
also be unable to effectively and efficiently perform
its duty of review. "To enable this Court to determine whether an order is arbitrary and capricious, the
Commission must make findings of fact that are
sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the
Court of the basis for the Commission's decision."
Mountain States Legal Found, 636 P.2d at 1051
(citations omitted). While these disadvantages may
not be reflected in the initial outcome of the hearing
below, they directly affect the ultimate outcome of
the matter on review and are therefore relevant to
the question of prejudice. It is axiomatic that die
denial of Adams's claim without the possibility of
meaningful review by this court, as provided for by
UAPA, is clearly prejudicial.

© 2011 Thomson Reuters.

Hie Fund has not established that the Commission's failure to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law was harmless as defined in Morton International, at 584-585. ™* We therefore resolve any doubt in Adams's favor and hold that
Adams was prejudiced by die Commission's failure
to make adequate factual findings and legal conclusions.
FN6. It is possible in some cases that the
failure to make adequate findings is nevertheless harmless. See, e.g, Nyrehn, 800
P.2d at 335 (failure to make findings necessary to determine whether a higher legal
standard should be applied before applying
the higher standard was harmless error
when the undisputed facts of the case satisfied the higher standard). Cf Olson v.
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985)
(even thougih findings were inadequate as
to financial needs of wife, no remand was
necessary because even accepting the
wife's evidence as true, there was no abuse
of discretion by trial court).
RELIEF
[20][21][22] As a general rule, the appropriate
relief for an agency's failure to make adequate findings is to vacate die order complained of and to order the agency to "make more adequate findings in
support of, and more fully articulate [the] reasons
for, the determination ... made." Vali Convalescent
& Care Insts., 797 P.2d at 450. However, as we
have acknowledged herein, absent adequate findings there is no presumption that the Commission's
decision is correct The process of articulation may
or may not cause the Commission to reach a different decision. Since we vacate the Commission's order denying benefits, it is free to deny benefits or
grant benefits as may be dictated by its new findings of fact and conclusions of law.™7
FN7. We express no opinion on the merits
of Adams's remaining claims inasmuch as
they may be resolved by the Commission's
entry of adequate findings. Her remaining
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claims are best left for another day.
*9 CONCLUSION
We vacate the Commission's order denying
Adams benefits and direct the Commission to produce adequate findings of fact and conclusions of
law and enter a new order.
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur.
UtahApp.,1991.
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n
821P.2dl
END OF DOCUMENT
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Supreme Court of Utah.
Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of Review,
Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 20026.
Nov. 14,1986.

157kl8 k. Weights, measures, and values.
Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court took judicial notice that liquid
milk weighs about the same as liquid water or approximately eight and one-third pounds per gallon;
thus, four gallons of milk weigh about 33 pounds
without the containers and crate, and six gallons of
milk weigh about 50 pounds without containers and
crate.
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^515

Worker, who sustained lower back injuries
while stacking milk crates containing four to six
gallons of milk, sought review of an order of the Industrial Commission, denying his motion for review of an order of an administrative law judge
denying his workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) finding that
worker's injury was not "by accident" was not
based on the evidence and, thus, was erroneous, but
(2) worker's claim would be remanded for further
fact finding as to whether action of worker, who
had previous back problems, in lifting several piles
of milk crates exceeded exertion which average
person typically undertook in nonemployment life
and whether medically demonstrable causal link existed between worker's lifting and injury to his back.
Vacated and remanded.
Hall, C.J., filed, opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, with Stewart, Associate C.J,,
joining in the dissent.
Stewart, Associate C.J., dissented and filed
opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Evidence 157 €^>18
157 Evidence
1571 Judicial Notice

413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation Ma>
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)1 In General
413k515 k. What are accidental injuries in general. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of workers' compensation, key requirement of an "accident" is that occurrence be
unanticipated, unplanned, and unintended; where
either cause of injury or result of exertion is different from what would normally be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by "accident"; clarifying Carling
v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 C=>515
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413V1I1(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)1 In General
413k515 k. W^hat are accidental injuries in general. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof
of unusual event may be helpful in determining
causal connection between injury and employment;
however, proof of unusual event is not required as
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an element of requirement that injury be "by accident." U.C. A. 1953, 35-1-45.
[4J Workers' Compensation 413 C=^>515
413 Workers' Compensation
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)1 In General
413k515 k. What are accidental injuries in general. Most Cited Cases
An "accident," for purposes of requirement that
injury be "by accident" to be compensable under
Workers' Compensation Act, is an unexpected or
unintended occurrence that may be either the cause
or the result of an injury; abandoning Redman
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm% 22 Utah
2d 398, 545 P.2d 283; Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v.
Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Billings Computer
Corp. v. Tarango, 61A P.2d 104 (Utah).
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
[5] Workers' Compensation 413 C^>568.2
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIH(A)5 Particular Injuries and Consequences
413k568.1 Trauma, Muscular Strains,
and Consequences of Exertion and Overexertion
413k568.2 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 413k568)
Key question in workers' compensation case in
determining causation is whether, given worker's
body and worker's exertion, the exertion in fact
contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €==>552
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously
Impaired Condition
413k552 k. In general. Most Cited
Workers' Compensation 413 €=>568.2
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413VIII(A)5 Particular Injuries and Consequences
413k568.1 Trauma, Muscular Strains,
and Consequences of Exertion and Overexertion
413k568.2 k. In general Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 413k568)
Only those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by employment increases risk of injury which worker normally faces
in his everyday life is compensable under Workers'
Compensation Act; injuries which coincidentally
occur at work because preexisting condition results
in symptoms which appear during work hours
without any enhancement from the work place are
not compensable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
[7] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>597
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(B) Remote and Proximate Consequences
413k597 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of workers' compensation, twopart causation test, requiring consideration of legal
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cause and medical cause of injury, is required in determining whether causal connection exists between
injury and worker's employment; abandoning
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104
(Utah); Sabo's Elec. Sen>. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah);
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp.,
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v.
Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331;
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah);
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693
(Utah); Residential and Commercial Construction
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961.
U.CA.1953,35-145
[8] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^553
413 Workers1 Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical
Harm
413Vlli(A)4 Aggra * ation of Pi e\ iously
Impaired Condition
413k553 k. Necessity of accident and
causal connection. Most Cited Cases
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condition which contributes to injury, unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove "legal
causation," for purposes of two-part causation test
for determining whether causal connection exists
between claimant's injury and claimant's employment; where there is no preexisting condition, a
usual or an ordinary exertion is sufficient to prove
legal causation. U.CA.1953, 35-1-45.

413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Comper nation IV!; i;>
Be Had
413VIII(B) Remote and Proximate Consequences
413k597 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
For purposes of legal causation element of twopart test for determining whether causal connection
exists between claimant's injury and claimant's employment, precipitating exertion must be compared
with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life of people in general, not nonemployment life of the particular claimant in question.
U.CA.1953, 35-1-45.
[10] Workei s'Compensaf i.« >n413C= : 597
413 Workers' Compensation
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May
Be Had
413VIII(B) Remote and Prox imate C onsequences
413k597 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Under medical causation portion of two-part
test for determining whether causal connection exists between claimant's injury and claimant's employment, claimant must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to resulting injury or disability. U.CA.1953, 35-1-45.
111! W oi ke t ! ' €« • npensati< > n 113 €= : 1390
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(M) Admissibility of Evidence
413kl390 k. Injury arising out of and in
course of employment. Most Cited Cases
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness of employee's exertions may be relevant to medical conclusion of causal connection between claimant's injury and claimant's employment IJ.C.A1953,
35-1-45.
1121 ' Vo i kei s"' C o m p en s a t i o n 413 C---'"11531,4

[9] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>597
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413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and Consequences Thereof
413kl531.1 Particular Injuries and
Consequences
413kl531.4 k. Back injuries. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 413kl533)
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was
not "by accident" as claimant was stacking milk
crates was not based on the evidence and, thus, was
erroneous; claimant experienced unexpected and
unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted crate of
milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant had not
complained of pain or limitations at his job, and no
evidence indicated that injury was predictable or
developed gradually as with occupational disease or
progressive back disorder. U.C.A.1953,35-1-45.
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1950
413 Workers' Compensation
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation
413XVI(T) Review by Court
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposition of Proceeding
413kl950 k. Instructions on remand.
Most Cited Cases
Compensation claim of worker, who had preexisting back problems and sustained lower back injuries while stacking crates containing four to six
gallons of milk, was remanded for further fact finding on issue as to whether moving and lifting several piles of crates weighing 30 to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler exceeded exertion average person typically undertook in nonemployment life and
whether there was medically demonstrable causal
link between worker's action in lifting milk crates
and injury to his back and, thus, ultimately, whether
his injury "arose out of or in the course of employment." U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Second Injury.
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt Lake City,
for State Ins. Fund.

DURHAM, Justice:
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review from
the Industrial Commission's denial of his motion
for review of an administrative law judge order
denying him compensation for a back injury sustained at work. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand.
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claimant, aged
36, was employed as night manager of Kent's
Foods. The claimant testified to the following version of events at a hearing before an administrative
law judge. The claimant was working in a confined
cooler in the store stacking crates, containing four
to six gallons FN1 of milk, from the floor onto a
cooler shelf. While lifting one crate to about chest
level, he suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower
back. He immediately set down the crate and asked
another employee to continue stocking the shelves.
The claimant completed the one-half hour remaining in his shift doing desk work. That night the pain
increased, and by morning his left leg felt numb.
Four or five days later, he saw Dr. Ivan Wright
about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during
December were followed through with the prescribed treatment of bed rest and medication. A myelogram finally revealed a herniated disc, and the
claimant spent ten days in traction in the hospital in
early January. He did not return to work.
FN1. We take judicial notice that liquid
milk weighs about the same as liquid water
or approximately 8 1/3 pounds per gallon.
Thus, four gallons of milk weigh about 33
pounds without the containers and crate.
Six gallons of milk weigh approximately
50 pounds without the containers and crate.
The claimant also testified he had a history of

*17 Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff.
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prior back injuries, including a fall from a telephone pole at age fourteen which required him to
wear a back brace for several months, a back injur}
in 1977 while lifting sand bags for the Logan
School District, and another fall while working for
that employer when he slipped on a slick concrete
ramp and broke his coccyx. None of the prior injur
ies resulted in prolonged absences from work.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the
claimant, who had suffered preexisting back problems and was injured as the result of an exertion
usual and typical for his job, was injured "by accident arising out of or in the course of employment"
as required by the Workers' Compensation Act,
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986) That Act, in
pertinent part, provides:

The testimony from other sources varied
slightly from the report given by the claimant. The
employer's report of injury describes the accident as
"picking up freight and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes and stacking them from truck." No specific event was mentioned in the employer's report.
The medical records of treating physicians described the claimant's previous injuries, but omitted
any reference to a specific incident in the cooler.
Dr. Hannan, who examined the claimant on December 31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember any
distinct episode as having precipitated his current
problem, however." And in a letter from Dr. Bryner
to Dr. Wright dated January 13, 1983, the
claimant's history was related as follows: "About
six weeks ago, however, he was lifting material at
work, and recalls no specific injury or stress but developed discomfort in his left groin area which ultimately extended into his big toe."

Every employee ... who is injured ... by accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment
... shall be paid compensation for loss sustained
on account of the injury....

The administrative law judge found that the
claimant's injury to his back on November 23,
1982, was not "an injury by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment." It is apparent that
the administrative law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" because there was no identifiable *18 event that
caused the injury and because lifting the crates of
milk was a routine and commonplace exertion expected of the job. The administrative law judge analogized the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980),
where a gradually developed back injury was held
to be not compensable where the condition
worsened without the intervention of any external
occurrence or trauma.

Id. This statute creates two prerequisites for a
finding of a compensable injury. First, the injury
must be "by accident." Second, the language
"arising out of or in the course of employment" requires that there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh Testing
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah
1983). Prior decisions by this Court have often
failed to distinguish the analysis of the accident
question from the discussion of causation elements.
FN2
As a result, this Court and the Commission are
faced with confusing and often inconsistent precedent. For this reason we now undertake a fresh look
at the policy and historical background of the workers' compensation statute in an attempt to provide a
clear and workable rule for future application by
the Commission.
FN2. We note that in any of our prior opinions so intermingled the causation and accident analyses that it is impossible to segregate them and determine the basis for
the Court's decision. For example, the
opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642
P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the accident
and causation elements in the following
language: "It appears to be mere coincidence that defendant's injury ... occurred at
work. Defendant bears the burden of showing otherwise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties of employment to unexpected injury is simply lacking.... [T]he Com-
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mission's conclusion that an accident occurred is without any substantive support
in the record." Id. at 726 (footnotes omitted). See also Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n,
590 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar
v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382
P.2d 414 (1963). For an example of an
opinion which does separate the accident
and causation analysis, see Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah
1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
I.
The term "by accident" is not defined in the
workers' compensation statutes. The most frequently referenced authority for the definition of
"by accident" is the case of Carling v. Industrial
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965),
where the term was defined as follows:
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of
events.... [T]his is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at
one particular time and does not preclude the
possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such
manner as to properly fall within the definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such
an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as
occupational diseases....
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones v.
California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 616, 244
P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961
(1949)). Some confusion has developed as to
whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual
event. This issue frequently arises when the employee suffers an internal failure ™3 brought about
by exertions in the *19 workplace. It is clear,
however, that our cases have defined "by accident"

to include internal failures resulting from both usual and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980).
FN3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of injuries that arise from general organ or structural failure brought about by
an exertion in the workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by this Court include
heart attacks, hernias, and back injuries.
See generally, Note, Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission and Injury Compensability
under Utah Worker's Compensation Law:
A Just Result or Just Another "Living
Corpse"?, 1981 UtahL.Rev. 393.
This Court first discussed the term "by accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 (1922), where an accident was said to be "something out of the ordinary,
unexpected, and definitely located as to time and
place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. This definition
was used to distinguish injuries which occurred
gradually and were covered under statutory provisions for occupational disease. Id. The Court in
Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where the
claimant suffers an internal failure the "unexpected
result" rule of the seminal English case of Fenton v.
Thorley, [1903] A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C.
1, is appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling observed:
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, nothing
more is required than that the harm that the
plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected.... It is
enough that the causes, themselves known and
usual, should produce a result which on a particular occasion is neither designed nor expected. The
test as to whether an injury is unexpected, and so,
if received on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident,' is that the sufferer did not intend or expect
that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was doing."
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A
Problem in The Drafting of Workmen's Compensa-

©2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 7
729P.2dl5
(Cite as: 729 P.2d 15)
Hon Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev. 328, 340 (1912)
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in Tintic
affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident.
After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily rejected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton
v. Thorley in internal failure cases on the ground
that the definition of "by accident" required an unusual occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103
(1925), the Court denied compensation to a worker
who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while
manually unloading a railroad car of coal on the
ground that no overexertion occurred during the
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104. That decision
was apparently overruled, however, when the Court
embraced the "unexpected result" rule and awarded
compensation to an employee who suffered a heart
attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning
the weirs to a city reservoir. Hammond v. Industrial
Commission, 84 Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695
(1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937), where a unanimous Court held that the employee, who had
suffered a ruptured aorta from riding a caterpillar
tractor over rough ground, suffered an injury "by
accident" since the result was "an unusual, unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and definite as to time and place. Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134.
And, in Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n.
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of benefits to a claimant who had suffered from heart disease and experienced a heart attack shortly after
moving 52 boxes weighing 50 to 100 pounds and
28 sacks of fire clay-work that was unusually heavy
and greatly in excess of his ordinary duties. The
Court pointed out, in dicta, that the English common law would have awarded compensation even if
the exertions were ordinary and usually required as
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 P.2d at
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235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen article, supra, the
Court observed:
*20 "[NJothing more is required than that the
harm that the plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected.... The element of unexpectedness inherent in the word 'accident' is sufficiently supplied ... if, though the act is usual and the conditions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen by him
who suffers it."
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237.
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949),
this Court explicitly adopted the English rule for
the definition of an accident and awarded benefits
to a claimant who unexpectedly injured his back
while stepping on the brake pedal of a delivery
truck-a usual and ordinary activity. See 115 Utah
14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. After summarizing early
Utah cases interpreting "by accident" the Court
concluded that "since 1922 this court has uniformly
held that an unexpected internal failure meets the
requirements of ["by accident"] and the legislature
by failing to amend has acquiesced in that construction " 115 Utah at 15, 201 P.2d at 968.
The holding of Purity Biscuit also squarely embraced the concept that an ordinary or usual exertion that results in an unexpected injury is compensable. See 115 Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70.
After carefully considering the legislative purpose
of the workers' compensation statute, prior precedent, and public policy, the Court rejected the requirement that proof of an unusual activity or exertion be a required element of the "by accident"
definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 967-70.
The Court concluded that "there is nothing in the
statute which would justify a holding that an injury
is compensable where overexertion is shown but is
not compensable where only ordinary exertion is
shown, provided that in both cases it is shown that
the exertion causes the injury." FN4 115 Utah at 19,
201 P.2d at 970.
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FN4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was
questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n,
19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967),
where the opinion erroneously stated that
Purity Biscuit "has never been cited by this
or any other court to support the law of
that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had
been relied upon in decisions from the
courts of nine other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v. Grantham, 263 Ala.
179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204, 208 (1955)
(finding of unusual strain or exertion unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave
& Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147,
151-52, 296 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) (
Purity Biscuit cited as stating majority position that usual exertion causing an internal
failure may be by accident); Argonaut Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 231
Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635
(1964) (relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit ); Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co.,
138 So.2d 308, 314 (Fla.1962) (back herniation from rupture of intervertebral disc
satisfies statutory requirement of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 268
Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559
(1964) (calls Purity Biscuit "a wellconsidered workmen's compensation case"
that supported an award where many
factors led to the disability); Murphy v.
Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208, 321
P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant
Stave, 227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at
439-40, and holding that a usual exertion
may lead to a compensable injury where
the causal relationship is established);
Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.J. 325,
327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) {Purity
Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is
an "injury by accident"); Olson v. State In-

dust. Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407,
416-17, 352 P.2d 1096, 1101 (1960)
(O'Connell,
J.,
specially
concurring)
(dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Cooper
v. Vinatien, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d
747, 750-51 (1950) {Purity Biscuit cited as
an example of the divergent viewpoints for
defining a compensable accident).
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit
was relied upon by the majority in three
Utah cases. See Jones v. California
Packing Co., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d
640, 642; Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202;
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this
support for the decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen concluded
without further discussion that "[t]he
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a
healthy reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at
376, 431 P.2d at 800. Two years later in
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283
(1969), the Court again questioned the
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial
analysis that concluded: "Purity enjoys
the unique and doubtful distinction of
being a living corpse." 22 Utah 2d at
403, 454 P.2d at 286. After considering
those cases from Utah and other jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit,
we now cannot agree that it was a
"living corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission,
617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980).
*21 Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases have
held that an internal injury may be compensable if
it results from either a usual or unusual exertion in
the course of employment. See, e.g., Champion
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d
306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer caused by lifting
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an unusually heavy beam); Pittsburg Testing
Laboratories v. Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367
(unforeseen and unanticipated heart attack resulting
from exertion while inspecting roof structure);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah
1981) (back injury resulting from shoveling coal
compensable despite usualness of activity and presence of preexisting conditions); Painter Motor v.
Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting from moving heavy boxes and installing
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting from carrying steel plates compensable despite prior history of back disorders and ordinary
activity); United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack resulting from
exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA
Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (
heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v.
Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565
P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver suffered heart
attack after repeatedly climbing long steps); Residential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (back injury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740
(1967) (heart distress occurring over a period of
several months compensable despite preexisting
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury resulting from filing papers in lower drawer compensable).
Despite the strong precedential support for applying the "unexpected result" rule of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases, a separate line of opposing authority has developed which requires
overexertion or an unusual event to prove an injury
occurred "by accident." Typically, these cases
denied compensation because the claimants' ordinary work duties precipitated the injury. Consequently, there were no events or exertions that
were unusual or extraordinary to qualify as "by accident." See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v.
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation

for knee injury denied where circumstances precipitating the injury were commonplace and usual);
Sabofs Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah 1982) (back injury from loading box of
twelve radios into van not compensable); Farmer's
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980) (back injury to claimant with preexisting
condition resulting from delivery of 100-pound
sacks not compensable since the activity was not
unusual or unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury suffered by janitor upon standing up not compensable without
evidence that activities were unusual); Redman
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22
Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not
compensable without proof of an unusual event).
These cases will not be collectively referred to as
the Redman line of cases.
[2] We are now convinced that the Redman line
of cases has misconstrued the historical and logical
definition of "by accident." The Redman line of
cases relied on the following abridged version of
the definition of an accident found in Carling v. Industrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events. " 16 Utah at 261, 399 P.2d at
203 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). In Redman, the highlighted phrase was interpreted to require an unusual event before there can be an accident. This interpretation misconstrues the Carling
decision itself and is inconsistent with the English
definition of "by accident" used by this Court since
1922. The key requirement of an accident under the
*22 Carling decision, as well as prior decisions,
was that the occurrence be unanticipated, unplanned and unintended. The highlighted phrase
emphasized that where either the cause of the injury
or the result of an exertion was different from what
would normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and
therefore "by accident."
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Policy considerations also militate in favor of
rejecting the notion that the phrase "by accident"
requires an unusual event. There is nothing in the
term "accident" that suggests that only that which is
unusual is accidental. See Robertson v. Industrial
Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 163 P.2d at 335,
338 (Wade, J., concurring; Wolfe, J., dissenting).
An accident does not occur simply because a worker is injured during an unusual activity. This argument is illustrated by Professor Larson in his treatise on workmen's compensation with the following
example:
If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, the cause (i.e.,
the lifting) is no more accidental than if he deliberately lifted a normal load. Or if a gardener deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain,
a passerby observing him would not say that he
was undergoing an accident merely because it is
unusual to mow lawns in the rain.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at
7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual distinction as being unworkable in practice. Realistically,
it is impossible to determine what are the usual and
normal requirements of a job. People work in good
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well as light
ones, and work for long hours as well as short ones.
None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id. § 38.63 at 7-164 to -168.
The unworkability of the usual-unusual event
requirement is further evidenced by comparing
seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court.
Compare Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(back injury to miner with previous back problems
held to be a compensable accident despite being
caused by shoveling coal in the usual course of employment), with Farmer's Grain Cooperative v.
Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (no accident where worker
with previous back problems sustained back injury
while delivering 100-pound bags of whey); compare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d

141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable accident for back
injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer)
with Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 61A P.2d
104 (no accident where worker sustained knee injury resulting from bending to pick up small parts).
[3] [4] We believe that the Court's real concern
in the Redman line of cases was the presence or absence of proof of causation to support an award of
compensation. See generally Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332
(Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed in the
next section, the Court has developed two parallel
lines of authority on the causation issue, one of
which requires an unusual event in order to meet
the statutory causation requirement. Although proof
of an unusual event may be helpful in determining
causation, it is not required as an element of "by accident" in section 35-1-45. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpectedness." Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm those
cases which hold that an accident is an unexpected
or unintended occurrence that may be either the
cause or the result of an injury. We thus necessarily
abandon the analysis of "by accident" in the Redman line of cases which predicates the "accident"
determination upon the occurrence of an unusual
event.
II.
The second element of a compensable accident
requires proof of a causal connection between the
injury and the worker's employment duties. Pittsburg Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367,
1370 (Utah 1983). In workers' compensation *23
cases involving internal failures, the key issue is
usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is
proved by the production and interpretation of medical evidence either alone or together with other
evidence. See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370;
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693,
695 (Utah 1980). Because of the difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures and because of the pos-
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sibility that a preexisting condition may have contributed to the injury, special causation rules have
been developed for internal failure cases. See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201
P.2d 970-71 (Wolfe, J., concurring specially).
This Court initially responded to the problem
of causation in internal failure cases by suggesting
that the Commission use a clear and convincing
evidence standard when an internal failure was
caused by an exertion in the workplace. ™5 See
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 74, 138 P.2d 233,
238 (1943). The clear and convincing evidence
standard was rejected, however, in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah
1979), with the rationale that such a standard would
make workers' compensation benefits nearly impossible to recover where the deceased suffered
from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the
standard to prove causal connection is preponderance of the evidence. Id.
FN5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of
proof is still used where the employee suffers from a preexisting condition. See
Mann v. City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583,
592,319 N.W.2d 454,458 (1982).
The second method that has been used to ensure causal connection in internal failure cases is to
require proof that an unusual event or activity precipitated the injury. Presumably, this requirement
was used to prevent compensating a person predisposed to internal failure where the preexisting condition contributed more to the injury than his usual
work activity. The following internal failure cases
illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is necessary to prove causation. Billings Computer Cotp. v. Tarango, 614 P.2d 104, 106-07
(Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642
P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah 1982); Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 1978); Nu-

zum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp.,
565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640
(1952); Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission,
104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 233; see Schmidt, 617
P.2d at 697-99 (Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-39
(Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 799 (1967); Purity
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer,
J., dissenting). Defendants argue that any rule that
awards compensation based on usual exertion will
open the floodgates for payment of benefits for all
internal injuries that coincidentally occur at work.
They claim that the unusual exertion requirement is
necessary to prevent the employer from becoming a
general insurer. They argue that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for persons with a history or indication of physical disability or handicap will be reduced.
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us to follow a separate line of authority that awards compensation for
injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace activity. These cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged in a
workplace activity and where there is adequate
evidence of medical causation. See, e.g., Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981)
(award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's
back injury despite absence of unusual incident);
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d at 695
(compensation awarded for *24 back injuries
arising from ordinary duties upon proof of medical
causal connection between workplace exertions and
the injury); Residential and Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427
(Utah 1974) (carpenter's back injury from lifting,
bending, and twisting in the ordinary course of
work compensable); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967)
(awarding compensation to fireman for exertions in
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the normal course of employment-the Court rejecting the unusual exertion test in favor of ordinary
exertion); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission,
115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-76, 431 P.2d
at 800, that decision failed to explicitly overrule the
usual exertion line of cases. Moreover, Residential
and Commercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation for usual
workplace activity after the Mellen decision.
Clearly, the usual exertion rule is not simply an aberration in Utah law.
When read in chronological sequence, our
opinions demonstrate an inconsistent and confused
approach to determining when an accident arose out
of or in the course of employment. Much of this
confusion can be traced to fundamental problems
stemming from the use of the usual-unusual distinction as a means of proving causation. Larson criticizes the unusual exertion requirement by itself as a
"clumsy and ill-fitting device with which to ensure
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.81, at
7-270. The problems in determining what activities
were usual or unusual were recognized as long ago
as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandoras
box of difficulties ... may be opened by the refinements between usual and unusual, exertion and
overexertion, ordinary and extraordinary exertion
measured by the individual involved or by the industrial function performed by him or both." Purity
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J.,
concurring specially). The contents of the Pandoras
box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the
plethora of our cases struggling with a definition of
a compensable accident based upon the usualness
or ordinariness of an activity.
Professor Larson has also criticized the usualunusual distinction because the ordinariness of the
activity fails to consider that some occupations

routinely require a usual exertion capable of causing injury. Likewise, other occupations, such as
deskwork, require so little physical effort that an
"unusual exertion" may be insufficient to prove that
the resulting accident arose out of the employment.
Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-270.FN6
FN6. Larson's observation is consistent
with this Court's rationale for rejecting the
unusual exertion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 16, 201 P.2d at 968:
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will
ever know what this court will consider
sufficient overexertion. Also under that
test if the work usually required by the
job is so great that it would break the
strongest man even he will not be able to
recover. But if it is more than usual exertion which causes the injury the employee can recover no matter how light the
work is which causes the injury.
Id.
[5] Because we find the present use of the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and our prior precedent inconsistent, we take this opportunity to examine an alternative causation analysis that may
better meet the objectives of the workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key question in
determining causation is whether, given this body
and this exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to
the injury. Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., concurring
specially).
[6] The language "arising out of or in the
course of his employment" found in U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was apparently intended to
ensure that compensation is only awarded where
there is a *25 sufficient causal connection between
the disability and the working conditions. The causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish
those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at
work because a preexisting condition results in
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symptoms which appear during work hours without
any enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those
injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by the employment increases the
risk of injury which the worker normally faces in
his everyday life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine
Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me. 1982). Only the latter
type of injury is compensable under U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45. There is no fixed formula by which the
causation issue may be resolved, and the issue must
be determined on the facts of each case.
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a two-part
causation test which is consistent with the purpose
of our workers' compensation laws and helpful in
determining causation. We therefore adopt that test.
Larson suggests that compensable injuries can best
be identified by first considering the legal cause of
the injury and then its medical cause. Larson,
supra, § 38.83(a), at 7-273. "Under the legal test,
the law must define what kind of exertion satisfies
the test of 'arising out of the employment' ... [then]
the doctors must say whether the exertion (having
been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this [injury]." FN7 Larson,
supra, § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277.
FN7. Cases from other jurisdictions which
have accepted the dual-causation standard
suggested by Larson include: Market
Foods Distribs., Inc. v. Levenson, 383
So.2d
726
(Fla.DistCt.App.1980)
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease
denied compensation where injury could
have been triggered at any time during normal movement and exertion at work not
greater than typical nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc.,
418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) (claimant granted
compensation where injury resulted from
stress, exertion, and strain greater than that
in everyday nonemployment life); Bryant
v. Masters Mack Co., 444 A.2d 329
(Me. 1982) (claimant with preexisting condition awarded compensation for back in-

jury resulting from fall from his stool at
work because of increased risk of falling
where employees moved around him at
work); Barrett v. Herbert Eng'g, Inc., 371
A.2d 633 (Me. 1977) (claimant with preexisting back condition denied compensation
for injury resulting from working at normal
gait since there was no work-related enhancement of personal risk); Mann v. City
of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454
(1982) (policeman with history of heart
disease awarded compensation for heart attack at home where claimant's physician
testified that attack was caused by stress of
police work rather than personal risk
factors); Sellens v. Allen Prods. Co., 206
Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980)
(claimant with preexisting heart problems
denied compensation for heart attack
suffered while unloading 28-pound cases
from truck trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle using objective standard
of average worker in nonemployment life);
Couture v. Mammoth Groceries, Inc., 116
N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421 (1976) (claimant
with no preexisting heart problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting beef
medically caused the fatal heart attack).
[8] 1. Legal Cause-Whether an injury arose out
of or in the course of employment is difficult to determine where the employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting condition. Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified
from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an industrial accident is compensable...." Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967)
(footnote omitted). To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition
must show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his condi-
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tion. This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than
that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra
exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition
of the employee as a likely cause of the injury,
thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at
work. Larson, supra, § 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson
summarized how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows:
*26 If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a [preexisting condition], the
employment contribution must take the form of
an exertion greater than that of nonemployment
life....
If there is no personal causal contribution, that
is, if there is no prior weakness or disease, any
exertion connected with the employment and
causally connected with the [injury] as a matter
of medical fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test
of causation.
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from a
preexisting condition which contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation. Where there is no
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion
is sufficient.™8
FN8. Larson highlights the difference
between the unusual-usual exertion test
with the rule we today adopt with the following examples of extreme cases in the
heart attack area:
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting
of 200-pound bags, and one such
200-pound lift medically produces a
heart attack. Under the old unusual-exertion rule there would be no compensation, regardless of previous heart condition. Under the suggested rule there
would be compensation, even in the
presence of a history of heart disease,

because people generally do not lift
200-pound weights as a part of nonemployment life, and therefore this episode
cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear
and tear of life.
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the
job, and suppose there is medical testimony that this lift caused his heart attack. Under the old test, exclusively concerned with the comparison between this
employee's usual exertions and the precipitating exertion, there would be compensation. Under the suggested rule the
result would depend on whether there
was a personal causal element in the
form of a previously weakened heart. If
there was not, compensation would be
awarded, since the employment contributed something and the employee's personal life nothing to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a previously
weakened heart], compensation would
be denied in spite of the medical causal
contribution, because legally the personal causal contribution was substantial,
while the employment added nothing to
the usual wear and tear of life-which certainly includes lifting objects weighing
20 pounds such as bags of golf clubs,
minnow pails, and step ladders.
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at
(footnote omitted).

7-280-81

[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion that the
comparison between the usual and unusual exertion
be defined according to an objective standard.
"Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usual exertion in his employment but with the
exertions of normal nonemployment life of this or
any other person." Larson, supra, § 38.83(b), at
7-279 (emphasis in original). See also JohnsManville Products v. Industrial Commission, 78
I11.2d 171, 178, 35 Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d
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606, 610 (1979) (compensation denied where the
risk of the employment activity "is no greater than
that to which he would have been exposed had he
not been so employed"); Strickland v. National
Gypsum
Co.,
348
So.2d
497,
499
(Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk must be " 'a
danger or risk materially in excess of that to which
people not so employed are exposed....' " Quoting
from City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App.
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)). But see
Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v. Levenson, 383
So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980) (subjective
test: "the employment must involve an exertion
greater than that normally performed by the employee during his non-employment life"). Thus, the
precipitating exertion must be compared with the
usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life of the particular worker.
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more consistent and predictable
standard for the Commission and this Court to follow. In evaluating typical nonemployment activity,
the focus is on what typical nonemployment activities are generally expected of people in today's society, not what this particular claimant is accustomed
to doing. Typical activities and exertions expected
of men and women in the latter part of the 20th century, for example, include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel,
changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in
buildings. By *27 using an objective standard, the
case law will eventually define a standard for typical "nonemployment activity" in much the way case
law has developed the standard of care for the reasonable man in tort law.
[10] 2. Medical Cause-The second part of Larson's dual-causation test requires that the claimant
prove the disability is medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related
activity. The purpose of the medical cause test is to
ensure that there is a medically demonstrable causal

link between the work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted from those strains.
The medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent claims.
With the issue being one primarily of causation,
the importance of the ... medical panel becomes
manifest. It is through the expertise of the medical panel that the Commission should be able to
make the determination of whether the injury sustained by a claimant is causally connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment.
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Under the medical cause test, the claimant
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that
the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability.
In the event the claimant cannot show a medical
causal connection, compensation should be denied.
FN9

FN9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of the employee's exertions may be
relevant to the medical conclusion of causal connection. Where the injury results
from latent symptoms with an illness such
as heart disease, proof of medical causation may be especially difficult. Larson's
treatise cites many examples of cases
where compensation claims were defeated
because of inadequate proof of medical
causation. See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at
7-319 to -321. Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626
(La. 1982) (heart attack triggered by stress,
exertion, and strain greater than sedentary
life of average worker compensable).
III.
[11] We now undertake to apply the foregoing
analysis to the case before us. In reviewing findings
of fact of the Industrial Commission, we determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's findings. Champion Home Builders
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v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah
1985).
[12] We have previously stated that the key
element of whether an injury occurred "by accident" is whether the injury was unexpected. After
reviewing the record, we find no substantial evidence that the injury was not unexpected. It is clear
from the uncontradicted testimony of the claimant
that he experienced an unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted a crate of milk in
the cramped area of the cooler. Although the
claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had
not complained of pain or limitations at his job with
Kent's Foods. There is no evidence which indicates
that this injury was predictable or that it developed
gradually as with an occupational disease or progressive back disorder. While the employer's report
of injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurred in
the cooler, the reports are unhelpful in determining
whether the injury was unexpected.
It appears that the administrative law judge applied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining
an accident. We have rejected that test in lieu of a
test based on unexpectedness. Moreover, the administrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries
is not determinative of whether an accident occurred. We have previously held that the aggravation or "lighting up" of a preexisting condition by
an internal failure is a compensable accident.
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude therefore that the decision of the Commission that the
claimant's injury was not "by accident" was not
based on the evidence, and that decision is, therefore, erroneous.
[13] The key issue in this case, like most internal failure cases, is whether the injury "arose out
of or in the course of *28 employment." Since the
claimant had previous back problems, to meet the
legal causation requirement he must show that
moving and lifting several piles of dairy products
weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the confined area

of the cooler exceeded the exertion that the average
person typically undertakes in nonemployment life.
The evidence presented by the claimant was insufficient for us to make a determination regarding legal
causation. It is unclear from the record how many
crates were moved by the claimant, the distance the
crates were moved, the precise weight of the crates,
and the size of the area in which the lifting and
moving took place. Because the claimant did not
have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we remand for further fact-finding on this issue.
Moreover, the record is insufficient to show
medical causation. It is unclear from the medical
reports whether the doctors were aware of the specific incident in the cooler. Further, the case was
not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation.
Without sufficient evidence of medical causation,
we are unable to determine whether there is a medically demonstrable causal link between the lift in
the cooler and the injury to the claimant's back. We
therefore remand to the Industrial Commission for
additional evidence and findings on the question of
medical causation.
The decision of the Commission is vacated and
remanded.
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and dissenting).
I concur in remanding this case to the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the
work incident aggravated a preexisting condition
such as would warrant an award of compensation.
TKl
However, I do not join the Court in adopting
an "unexpected result" standard to be applied in determining the existence of a compensable accident.
FN1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19
Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743
(1967).
I do not believe that this Court has
"misconstrued the historical and logical" definition
of "by accident" in the bulk of its recent cases concerning the issue at bar. The majority's reliance
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upon Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission
™2 is misplaced. The holding therein is without
precedential value because it has been simply ignored.™3 The only case in which this Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, FN4 which support is similarly without
precedential value because it has also been ignored
beginning with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler, FN5
the very next accident case handed down. In that
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission FN6 and again defined
"accident" as an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events. In my
view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our post-war case law.
FN2. 115 Utah 1,201 P.2d 961 (1949).
FN3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694
P.2d 606 (Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial
Comm'n, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); FritoLay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah
1984); Billings
Computer
Corp. v.
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah 1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631
P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980); Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d
328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d
398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399
P.2d 202 (1965).
FN4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).
FN5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).

occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an injury." (Emphasis in original.) However,
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to establish
policy, has chosen wording which precludes such
an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer's
dissent in Purity*29 Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of the majority's interpretation. The word
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may be used
to denote both an unexpected occurrence which
produces injury as well as an unexpected injury.
The word "injury," on the other hand, denotes a result and not a cause. Had the legislature only used
the word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1986)),
then that statute would cover all results regardless
of the cause. Had the legislature only used the word
"accident," then I would agree with the majority's
holding today that the legislature intended to cover
both the cause and the result. In fact, however, the
legislature has used both words "injury" and
"accident." It follows that the word "accident" must
be interpreted as focusing upon the cause and not
the result. In short, the majority's interpretation
writes the word "injury" out of the statute. Such a
decision is unwarranted in my view.
The legislature recently amended section
35-1-45,^ but chose to leave intact the standard
which limits the payment of compensation to those
injured "by accident arising out of or in the course
of ... employment." FN8 Moreover, the singular
"injury by accident" standard has not been altered
or amended since its inception in 19 HP*9 The legislature thus being satisfied with the Court's interpretation of the term "accident" in the long line of
cases beginning with Carling v. Industrial Commission, FNI° I decline to embark upon a new effort to
redefine that term.
FN7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1,
1984 Utah Laws 610, 610.

FN6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965) .
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an
injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended

FN8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol.
4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1986).
FN9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, §
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52a, 1917 Utah Laws 306,322-23.
FN10. 16 Utah 2d 260,399 P.2d 202 (1965).

STEWART, Justice: (dissenting).
I dissent. The majority defines the statutory
term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," regardless of whether it is produced by a usual or an
unusual event. The majority also defines the term
"arising out of or in the course of employment" to
impose legal and medical causation requirements.
SeeU.CA., 1953, §35-1-45.
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation"
has two different meanings, depending upon the
physical condition of the worker at the time he is
injured. A worker having no preexisting medical
condition or handicap need only prove that the accident was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion."
But for congenitally handicapped persons and for
persons who have suffered preexisting industrial injuries (which presumably have left the worker with
some physical weakness or deterioration), legal
causation has a different meaning. Such a worker
may receive compensation only if the "employment
contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater
than that of nonemployment life." According to the
majority, such a worker must now prove that his internal breakdown was caused by " an unusual or extraordinary exertion'' in order to establish the requisite legal causation, even though the majority
opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual
distinction as a means of proving causation." How
the majority can reject that standard for persons
having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that
standard for persons with preexisting conditions, is
baffling.
Furthermore, the difference between the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which a worker
with a preexisting condition must demonstrate and
the "usual exertion" which a person with no preexisting condition must demonstrate is far from clear.
The latter standard is to be judged with respect to

the " 'normal nonemployment life of this or any
other person.' " The Court emphasizes that the
"precipitating exertion must be compared with the
usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life of the particular worker." What the term "usual wear and tear
and exertions of nonemployment" means is not
defined by the *30 majority. The few examples set
out do little to explain the concept aimed at, other
than to suggest that the term means something more
than simple, life-sustaining activities.
I wholly fail to understand why persons who
have a preexisting condition should be placed in the
disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless
position, that the majority opinion imposes upon
them. The purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to
provide compensation for workers who have preexisting medical conditions and therefore run a greater risk of injury when they expose themselves to the
hazards of the work place. But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than encouraging them to abandon the work force for some
kind of unearned support.
This Court has repeatedly stated that the
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers to hire persons with preexisting conditions
by spreading the risk throughout the industry to assure such persons that their injuries will be cared
for without imposing extraordinary liabilities on the
employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting
Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980);
McPhie v. United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504,
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to favor
those policies which encourage people to work,
rather than policies that deter employers from offering gainful employment to those who have a higher
risk of work-related injury. There is little personal
or social benefit from a policy that tends to discourage persons from working because of prior injuries
or disabilities.
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes of the workmen's
compensation laws to impose higher standards for
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compensation on those with preexisting medical
conditions than on those without. Tort law generally does not do so. A defendant in a negligence action is required to take the victim as the defendant
finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the victim may have are disregarded. That principle
should not be, and until now has not been, different
in workmen's compensation law, which is really a
substitute for tort law remedies. In short, handicapped or previously injured persons who are injured by an industrial accident are simply discriminated against by having to meet the majority's rigorous legal cause requirement.
I am also unable to understand how an administrative law judge, the Industrial Commission, or
an appellate court is supposed to determine what
"typical nonemployment activities" are "in today's
society," as they now must do for the purpose of
determining legal causation for workers with preexisting medical conditions. Does that mean what a
typical sixty-five-year-old does or a typical twentyone-year-old does during his or her nonemployment
activities? Is it what a professional football player
does in his leisure time or what a ballet dancer
does? Is it what a sedentary worker does in his or
her off-hours or what a forest ranger does?
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the
majority provides examples which supposedly illustrate the unarticulated principle. The examples
"include taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat
tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest
height, and climbing the stairs in buildings." These
few examples, which I find to be arguable in any
event since they reflect only what some people may
do from time to time, do not substitute for a legal
standard. I seriously wonder whether changing a
flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in
today's society, and I do not know how much luggage the "typical" individual lifts or how far he or
she carries it. The point is that the majority has not
set forth a workable standard at all. In fact, I have
serious doubt that such an artificial construct as

"typical nonemployment activities" will produce
more fair and rational decisions than our past cases.
The majority simply assumes a "typical" individual
for the purpose of establishing a rational standard.
Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people,
not to "average" people, and die law has always recognized *31 as much. In short, I do not think that
the majority's newly established standard will produce decisions one whit more consistent or rational
than those produced in the past.™1
FN1. In my view, the decisions of this
Court are generally reconcilable with only
a few glaring exceptions and most of them
prior to 1980. That there are more inconsistencies the further back one goes in our
body of law is not particularly unexpected.
In any event, I doubt that the new approach
will produce unwavering consistency over
the years.
The majority also holds that an injured person
must prove that the disability is "medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a
work-related activity." With a degree of hope that I
think is unwarranted, the majority states that "[t]he
medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general insurer of his employees and discourage fraudulent claims." I am fearful
that that hope is seriously misplaced.
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the source
of the Court's new standards and analysis, is highly
acclaimed in this field of law, but there is much to
be said for the case-by-case approach in hammering
out legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion produce inconsistencies. I readily concede that present
law needs to be rationalized and that some cases
should be overruled because they are hopelessly inconsistent with other cases, but I do not believe that
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a manner
as to defeat those humane policies intended to allow for the injuries of workers who come to the
work place in an impaired condition.
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent.
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Utah,1986.
Allen v. Industrial Com'n
729 P.2d 15
END OF DOCUMENT
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